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Abstract  
  
In his seminal 1989 article, “Family Law Reform in Scotland – 
Past, Present and Future”, Professor Eric M Clive analysed 
family law reform at the various stages in terms of three themes: 
liberty, equality and protection. Adopting these themes as 
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decades, highlighting remaining shortcomings and exploring 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a seminal article, “Family Law Reform in Scotland – Past, Present and Future”, 
published in this journal, in 1989, Professor Eric M. Clive identified the “three great 
themes of family law reform” since the middle of the 19th Century as liberty, equality 
and protection, and used them in his analysis of developments in family law in the three 
stages.1    
 
Thirty years later, it is both unsurprising and encouraging that Scots child and family law 
has moved on. During the early years of this period, the Scottish Law Commission 
offered plentiful recommendations for reform, some of which were taken up at 
Westminster.2 Post-devolution, successive Scottish Governments revisited 
unimplemented Commission proposals3 and pursued their own initiatives.4 International 
and regional instruments have played their part, with the European Convention on 
Human Rights5 (ECHR) being incorporated into domestic law.6 These efforts have been 
supplemented by a rich body of scholarly literature, something academics like to believe 
has an impact on the law reform process.   
 
This article adopts Professor Clive’s themes of liberty, equality and protection as 
benchmarks in analysing child and family law reform over the last three decades, 
highlighting remaining shortcomings and exploring how they might be addressed.  
  
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Eric M. Clive, “Family Law Reform in Scotland: Past, Present and Future” 1989 J.R. 133, 134.   
2 See, for example, the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.  
3 See, for example, the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, some of which implemented quite elderly 
Commission recommendations.  
4 Elaine E. Sutherland, “Child and Family Law: Progress and Pusillanimity” in Elaine E. Sutherland, Kay 
E. Goodall, Gavin F.M. Little and Fraser P. Davidson (eds), Law Making and the Scottish Parliament: The 
Early Years (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), p.58. 
5 ETS No. 155 (1950).  
6 Human Rights Act 1998. 
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ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 
  
A single development dominates any evaluation of the legal regulation of intimate adult 
relationships over the last thirty years. The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) 
Act 2014 marked the culmination of a decades-long struggle for what has come to be 
known as “marriage equality”, with same sex couples finally securing the right to marry 
and gaining the legal protection that flows from marriage.  
 
The values of liberty and equality were furthered when belief bodies were added to the 
list of civil and religious celebrants empowered to solemnise marriages and register civil 
partnerships. “Equality” is somewhat qualified, however, since the legislation continues 
to accord “A-list” status only to the Church of Scotland and then divides other religious 
and belief bodies into those on the “B-list”, all of whose celebrants may officiate, and the 
“C-listers”, where the body must nominate individual celebrants.7 
 
During the currency of the relationship, legal equality was already very much the order 
of the day by the late 20th Century and most of the gender-based, discriminatory 
consequences of marriage had long since been abolished.8 Occasional, anachronistic 
curiosities, like the defence to a charge of reset, available to wives, but not to 
husbands,9 and the right of a widow, but not a widower, to claim the cost of mourning 
clothes from the deceased spouse’s estate,10  lingered on and were laid to rest only 
recently.   
 
The liberty interests of those wishing to be freed from an unsatisfactory, formal 
relationship were enhanced when the periods of non-cohabitation required for a divorce 
or civil partnership dissolution were shorted from two years (accompanied by the 
                                                          
7 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 ss.8-12. 
8 The most recent pre-1989 “tiding up” legislation was the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 
1984. 
9 The common law defence was relevant to a wife who concealed stolen property brought into the family 
home by her husband. It was applied in Clark v Mone 1950 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 69, rejected in Smith v 
Watson 1982 S.L.T. 359 and abolished by the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 s.7. 
10 Abolished by the Succession (Scotland) Act 2016 s.26.   
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partner’s consent) and five years (no consent required), to one and two years, 
respectively.11 The vast majority of divorces now proceed on the basis of non-
cohabitation,12 bringing attendant benefits in terms of privacy, and the wisdom of the 
reform was illustrated graphically in the recent English case, Owens v Owens.13      
 
Considerable legislative efforts have been devoted to providing protection in the context 
of intimate relationships. The free consent of each party was always fundamental to 
entering a marriage and the legal system has long sought to protect against coercion by 
providing that, where apparent consent is a product of duress, the purported marriage is 
void.14 It became clear, however, that this alone was inadequate in preventing forced 
marriages, either in Scotland or by a person being lured out of the country for the 
ceremony15 and additional measures were put in place. The first is a new civil remedy, 
the forced marriage protection order, which aims to prevent such marriages from taking 
place.16 The second is a new statutory offence of coercing a person to enter a marriage 
or practising deception in order to entice a person abroad for the purpose of forced 
marriage.17 
 
It was appreciated long ago that general legal provisions, like interdicts or the law on 
assault, by themselves, provided inadequate protection against domestic abuse and 
that a more proactive and comprehensive approach was required. In 1981, legislation 
gave spouses the right to live in the family home, regardless of whether their significant 
other is the sole owner or tenant, and an abusive partner can be excluded from the 
home and other places, like a workplace or a child’s school, by court order.18 Civil 
                                                          
11 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s.1(2)(d) and (e), as amended by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, 
s.11. 
12 In 2015-16, 94% of divorces were founded on non-cohabitation: Civil Justice Statistics in Scotland 
2016-2017 (Scottish Government, 2017), p. 29: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00515767.pdf 
[Accessed 30 November 2018]. At the time of writing, while the overall statistics for 2016-17 are available, 
those on breakdown of divorce by grounds are not.  
13 [2018] UKSC 41; [2018] 3 W.L.R. 634. 
14 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 s.20A. See, for example, Sobrah v Khan 2002 S.C. 382. 
15 Singh v Singh 2005 S.L.T. 749. 
16 Forced Marriage etc. (Protection and Jurisdiction) (Scotland) Act 2011. 
17 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 s.122. 
18 Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981.   
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partners receive similar protection19 and it extends, often for more limited duration, to 
cohabitants.20  
 
Targeted remedies have been added over the years and there is now a range of 
interdicts, other court orders and criminal offences designed to protect spouses, civil 
partners and cohabitants from abuse21 and to protect all victims, irrespective of 
relationship status, from harassment,22 stalking23 and so-called “revenge porn”.24 Over 
time, the circumstances for the granting of specific orders have been refined,25 greater 
account has been taken of the domestic nature of interdicts26 and the domestic context 
of an offence is now an aggravation for sentencing purposes.27 Finally, in 2018, a 
specific offence of domestic abuse – that is, intentionally or recklessly engaging in a 
course of behaviour that a reasonable person would regard as likely to cause physical 
or psychological harm to a partner or former partner – was created.28  
 
It would be illusory to believe that legislation alone will eliminate domestic abuse. In 
2017-18, 59,541 incidents of domestic abuse were reported to the police in Scotland, an 
increase of 1% on the previous year,29 reflecting only part of the problem since many 
abusive incidents go unreported. In addition, there is concern that some professionals 
working in the legal system lack an in-depth understanding of domestic abuse and it is 
encouraging that the Scottish Government plans further consultation and action to 
                                                          
19 Civil Partnership Act 2004, ss.101-112 and 135. 
20 Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981 s.18. Initially, the Act applied only to 
different sex cohabitants and was extended to same sex cohabitants by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
2006 s.34. 
21 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act 2001, Domestic Abuse 
(Scotland) Act 2011 and the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016. 
22 Protection from Harassment Act 1997. 
23 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 s.39. 
24 Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 ss.2-4.  
25 For example, the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2011, amending the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 and refining the concept of harassment where it amounts to domestic abuse.   
26 For example, the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2011 s.3, providing for an interdict to be designated a 
“domestic abuse interdict”, breach of which is a criminal offence, attracting a possible sentence of up to 5 
years imprisonment, rather than contempt of court. 
27 Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 s.1. 
28 Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, s.1.  
29 Domestic Abuse Recorded by the Police in Scotland, 2017-18 (Scottish Government, 2018).  
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tackle domestic abuse.30 When it is remembered that it was not until 1989, the starting 
point of our enquiry, that a court accepted unequivocally that the law on rape applies 
within marriage,31 one gets a sense of both historical deficiencies and the progress that 
has been made.  
 
It is clear, then, that there has been progress in respect of all three of our benchmarks 
over the last three decades. That process has, however, been imperfect or incomplete, 
in places, and gaps and shortcoming remain.   
  
Same sex marriage – but not complete equality 
  
Scots law was hardly a trailblazer in making marriage available to same sex couples32 
and it followed the incremental pattern found in many other jurisdictions,33 with the final 
step being preceded by the decriminalisation of homosexuality;34 recognition of same 
sex relationships for specific, limited purposes;35 and the creation of civil partnership, a 
marriage-equivalent for same sex couples.36  
 
Civil partnership was a compromise designed to create a relationship for same sex 
couples that offered most of the legal consequences of marriage, while avoiding the use 
of the magic word in an effort to placate those opposed to making marriage more 
                                                          
30 Scottish Government, Delivering for Today, Investing for Tomorrow: The Government Programme for 
Scotland 2018-19 (2018), 104-105. 
31 S v. H.M. Advocate 1989 J.C. 469 
32 The Netherlands led the way, in 2001, and, by 2014, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
England and Wales, France, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Arica, Spain, Sweden and 
Uruguay had followed suit.  
33 William N. Eskridge, “Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-By-Step Approach 
Toward State Recognition” 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 641 (1999-2000); Kees Waaldijk, “Civil Developments: 
Patterns of Reform in the Legal Position of Same-Sex Partners in Europe” (2000) 17 Rev. Can. Dr. Fam. 
62.   
34 Homosexuality was not decriminalized until 1980, when the age of consent was set at 21: Criminal 
Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, s.80 (repealed). The age was later reduced to 18 and, eventually, to 16: 
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 s.28.   
35  See, for example, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, the Protection from Abuse (Scotland) 
Act 2001, the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 and the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 
2003. The courts contributed to this process: see, Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association [2001] 1 A.C. 
27 and Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 2 A.C. 557. 
36 Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
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inclusive. Like many compromises, it failed since the most virulent opponents were not 
appeased and supporters of same sex marriage continued to pursue their quest for full 
and equal recognition. While access to marriage has been secured for same sex 
couples, full equality has not and there are lingering differences that depend on the sex 
of the parties.   
 
Different treatment begins at the point of celebration. There is no problem over civil 
ceremonies since registrars are expected to discharge their duties for all.37 In the 
context of religious or belief ceremonies, it will be remembered that distinctions are 
drawn between different religious and belief groups in terms of which of their celebrants 
may solemnise marriage for different sex couples. These groups must then take a 
further, affirmative step – “opting in” – if their celebrants are to marry same sex couples 
and, even then, no individual celebrant is obliged to do so.38  
 
While the legislation is clearly designed to reflect respect for the religious freedom of 
groups and individuals opposed to same sex marriage, the result is that same sex 
couples are treated less favourably by being given less choice than are different sex 
couples. This inequality – and that impacting religious and belief groups more generally 
– could be eliminated very easily by providing for all marriages to be concluded by 
means of a civil ceremony, presided over by a registrar, an approach found in other 
jurisdictions.39 Couples would, of course, be free to have a religious or belief 
celebration, if they wished, in addition to the civil process. 
 
So much for solemnisation of marriage, but what of the trappings? Pockets of resistance 
remain, in the form of unhappy hoteliers and bakers (no butchers or candlestick-makers, 
thus far), who claim that respect for their religious freedom permits them to decline 
                                                          
37 Eweida v United Kingdom (2013) 57 E.H.R.R. 8. 
38 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 s.8(1B) and (1C). 
39 Elaine E Sutherland, “Giving the state sole jurisdiction over marriage would simplify the law”, J.L.S.S. 
online, April 2013: http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/58-4/1012446.aspx [Accessed 30 November 
2018].  
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service to same sex couples.  To do so would be a clear violation of the Equality Act 
2010.40     
 
At the other end of the spectrum, is the termination of marriage, with divorce being 
available to different sex couples where the marriage has broken down irretrievably or 
an interim gender recognition certificate has been issued to either party to the 
marriage.41 Irretrievable breakdown can be established only by proving one of four 
factual situations, known colloquially as: adultery; behaviour; non-cohabitation for one 
year, accompanied by the defender’s consent; and non-cohabitation for two years.  
 
On the face of it, divorce is available to all couples on the same basis. However, the use 
of adultery to demonstrate irretrievable breakdown merits special mention. Adultery is 
defined, in a rather old case, as “sexual intercourse … between a consenting spouse 
and a member of the opposite sex who is not the other spouse.”42 While individuals are 
not always consistent in their sexual preferences, that definition accommodates most 
infidelity that occurs in different sex marriages. When same sex marriage became 
available, the relevant statue was amended to make it clear that the definition of 
adultery remained unaltered.43 As a result, a same sex spouse may only found on 
adultery in respect of infidelity by the other spouse that occurred with a different sex 
person and not, as seems more likely, if his or her spouse has strayed with a person of 
the same sex. The path to divorce is not closed off, since same sex infidelity would 
usually constitute behaviour that makes it unreasonable to expect the pursuer to 
continue to cohabit with the defender, but there is no escaping the implication that 
sexual infidelity is viewed differently and, arguably, less seriously, in the same sex 
                                                          
40 See Hall v Bull [2013] UKSC 73; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 3741. In Lee v Ashers Baking Co. Ltd, also reported 
as Lee v McArthur [2018] UKSC 49; [2018] 3 W.L.R. 1294, the Supreme Court provided clarification on 
issues of discrimination, sexual orientation, freedom of religion and freedom of expression. For parallel 
developments in the US, see, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. V Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S.Ct. 
1719 (2018). 
41 1976 Act s.1.   
42 MacLennan v MacLennan 1958 S.C. 105, p 109, per Lord Wheatley.  
43 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 s.1(3A). 
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context.44 Yet again, inequality could be eliminated at a stroke – by removing adultery 
as one of the factual situation demonstrating irretrievable breakdown and addressing all 
sexual infidelity as a form of behaviour. 
   
Relationship equality 
 
The liberty interests of most of the Scottish population are respected in so far as they 
may engage in intimate relationships of their choosing largely free from state 
interference. Subject to wholly-defensible restrictions relating to age45 and consent46 
and, arguably less-defensible constraints on adult incest,47 the law has long since 
abandoned the business of policing individual morals through intrusive measures like 
the criminalisation of adultery and fornication.  
 
This permissive picture begins to unravel, however, when one turns to the relationships 
embraced by the civil law. Marriage, civil partnership and cohabitation are recognised 
by the legal system and, as a result, the parties to them are protected by a range of 
legal consequences attaching during the relationship and on breakdown. Each 
relationship is subject to its own definition, not all are equally accessible and their 
consequences vary, implicating all three of our benchmarks.   
 
Cohabitation   
 
The common law concept of marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute, much loved 
by academics and law students, narrowly escaped abolition48 but is now a shadow of its 
                                                          
44 Another explanation is the reluctance of legislators to acknowledge the sexual dimension of same sex 
relationships, something that also manifests itself in the fact that incurable impotence renders a different 
sex, but not a same sex, marriage voidable: Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 1914 s.5(1). 
45 The default age of consent to sexual activity is 16: Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 s.28. Higher 
ages apply in cases involving sexual abuse of trust (18 years old) and sexual intercourse between step-
parent and a step-child (21 years old): Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 ss.42-43 and Criminal Law 
(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 s.2, respectively.  
46 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 ss.12-17. 
47 Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 ss.1, 2 and 4. For a critique of the law, see, James A 
Roffee, “Incest: the exception to a principled Scottish sex law” 2012 J.R. 91. 
48 Policy Memorandum: Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill (2013), para.153. 
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former self, largely limited to providing a remedy for succession purposes only where 
the parties made an ineffectual attempt to marry abroad.49 One criticism of it, in its 
heyday, was that it rewarded deception. In contrast, the popular, modern phenomenon 
of “cohabitation proper” describes the situation where couples live together without 
formalising their relationship and make no pretence of being married. In the past, while 
they could sometimes secure redress under general, common law provisions,50 the 
legal system largely ignored them save for very limited purposes.51  
 
Cohabitation was brought in from the cold by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 and 
cohabitants (or former cohabitants) who qualify under the statutory definition52 are now 
given a degree of protection, benefitting from a range of provisions that apply during the 
relationship, on breakdown and in the event of a partner’s death.53 They may avoid 
these consequences by agreement or, in the case of inheritance, by making a will. 
Seeking redress from a court is subject to fairly short time limits that the court has no 
discretion to waive and, while some of the ambiguities in the legislation have been 
clarified,54 others remain.55  
 
The goal of the legislation was never to place cohabitants in the same legal position as 
married couples and civil partners and the remedies available to cohabitants are very 
much more limited than the comprehensive scheme provided for those in formal 
relationships. According a privileged status to marriage has been accepted by the 
European Court of Human Rights as a legitimate aim under Article 8 of the ECHR.56  
                                                          
49 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 s.3. Since the reform was of prospective effect only, cases involving 
the old law may yet come before the courts.  
50 Shilliday v Smith 1998 S.C. 725. For difficulty created by the interaction between the common law and 
the 2006 Act, see, Courtney’s Executors v Campbell [2016] CSOH 136; 2017 S.C.L.R. 387. The case is 
also known as Igoe v Campbell. 
51 See, for example, the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981 s.18. 
52 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 s.25. See, Gutcher v Butcher 2014 GWD 31-610; Harley v Thompson 
2015 Fam. L.R. 45. 
53 2006 Act ss.26-29. 
54 Gow v Grant 2013 SC (UKSC) 1: 2013 S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 1. 
55 These are set out fairly fully in the report of the Justice Committee, Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 
Post-legislative Review, SP Paper 963, 6th Report, 2016 (Session 4), paras. 7-39. 
56 Shackell v United Kingdom, Application No 45851/99, decision of 27 April 2000 (“marriage remains an 
institution that is widely accepted as conferring a particular status on those who enter it and, indeed, it is 
singled out for special treatment under Article 12 of the Convention”); Yiğit v Turkey (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 
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However, the usual test applies and different treatment will only survive a human rights 
challenge if the means employed are rationally connected to that aim and proportionate. 
As the UK Supreme Court demonstrated recently, denying widowed parent’s allowance 
to a bereaved parent who had been cohabiting, when it would have been paid had she 
been married, fails on both legs of that test.57 In this, the Court regarded the adverse 
impact of this different treatment on children as significant.58   
 
What are the implications of this for the lesser protection offered to parting and 
bereaved cohabitants in Scotland? At the heart of the matter lies the very variable 
motives of couples who cohabit, with some choosing cohabitation, quite deliberately, in 
order to avoid the package of legal consequences that accompanies marriage, while 
others misunderstand the law or give no thought to the legal consequences of their 
actions until it is too late.59  The greater protection attaching to marriage will not make it 
more attractive to the ignorant and naïve, since they will not appreciate its significance 
or will do so only imperfectly. It may make the poorer, informed cohabitant more inclined 
to marry, but it is unlikely to have that effect on the wealthier, savvy partner. Thus, there 
is little rational relationship between the current legal approach and promoting marriage. 
Then there is the matter of proportionality. The current law offers very different 
packages to spouse and civil partners, on the one hand, and to cohabitants, on the 
other. A more nuanced and, arguably, more proportionate response would be to attach 
all the legal consequences of marriage to cohabitation, but permit the parties the same 
latitude to contract out of them.    
  
Civil partnership 
 
As we have seen, civil partnership was created, in Scotland, as a compromise solution 
on the road to same sex marriage. Same sex couples now have three relationship 
                                                          
25.The UK Supreme Court shared that view: Re McLaughlin [2018] UKSC 48, [36] (“There is no doubt 
that the promotion of marriage, and now civil partnership, is a legitimate aim”).  
57 Re McLaughlin [2018] UKSC 48. 
58 Ibid, [40]. 
59 See further, Elaine E Sutherland, “From ‘Bidie-In’ to ‘Cohabitant’ in Scotland: The Perils of Legislative 
Compromise” (2013) 27 I.J.L.P.F. 143.   
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options available to them: marriage, civil partnership and cohabitation proper. For 
different sex couples, the choice is more limited since they cannot register a civil 
partnership and there is a certain irony in the fact that at the very time Scots law 
eliminated one form of discrimination, it created another.  
 
It became apparent that some different sex couples who would like to formalise their 
relationship find marriage unacceptable, but would be happy to conclude a civil 
partnership – and it is not difficult to see why. While marriage can be concluded by 
means of a civil ceremony, its religious and patriarchal associations are manifest. Were 
civil partnership to be extended to different sex couples, their liberty would be served by 
giving them choice, they would gain the protection of a formal relationship and the 
benchmark of equality would be met.  
 
Extending civil partnership to all couples was one option considered, but not favoured, 
by the Scottish Government when it consulted on the future of civil partnership in 
2015.60 The other two options it explored were the prospective abolition of civil 
partnership, something that has been done in a number of countries once marriage 
became available to same sex couples,61 and retaining it for same sex couples only. It 
made clear that, regardless of the reform option selected, existing civil partnerships 
would remain valid. Nor does it intend to convert civil partnerships into marriages by 
legislative fiat, a path taken elsewhere,62 causing an outcry from those affected who 
saw what amounts to government-imposed marriage as compromising their liberty. 
 
The Scottish Government delayed making a decision on how to proceed, in part, 
because it was awaiting the outcome of an English case where a different sex couple 
challenged their exclusion from civil partnership, founding on Articles 8 and 14 of the 
                                                          
60 Review of Civil Partnership - A consultation by the Scottish Government (Scottish Government, 
Edinburgh, 2015). 
61 See, Ingrid Lund-Anderson, “The Nordic Countries: Same Direction – Different Speeds”, in Katharina 
Boele-Woelki and Angelika Fuchs (eds), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), 3 at 4. 
62 In a few states in the United States, registered partnerships or civil unions were converted into 
marriages automatically on a specified date. See, for example, Wash. Rev. Code § 26.60.100(4) and 13 
Del. Code § 218(e).  
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ECHR.63 The Supreme Court agreed with them up to a point, condemning the 
government-created discrimination and declaring the Civil Partnership Act (in so far as it 
applied in England and Wales) to be incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998.64 
That decision did not resolve the matter, however, since the Court left it to Westminster 
to decide whether to abolish civil partnership prospectively or to make it available to all 
couples in England and Wales. The Scottish Government will have to make that 
decision as well and it duly launched a further public consultation.65  Days later, the 
Prime Minister, Theresa May, indicated that different sex couples in England and Wales 
would be given access to civil partnership.66 Since it would be open to Scottish couples 
to head over the border to take advantage of that option, in a sense, the debate in 
Scotland was over before it began and there is no doubt that liberty and equality would 
be served by the Scottish Government bowing to the inevitable.  
 
Multi-partner relationships 
 
Scots law does not embrace multi-partner relationships. Any attempt to enter a marriage 
or civil partnership, while in another, is void67 and the conduct itself is criminal.68 While 
the courts can pronounce on the validity of polygamous marriages and provide relief to 
the parties,69 that is not the same thing as accommodating them by having a system in 
place to address the complexities they present. Should the legal system abandon its 
attachment to mononormativity, respect freedom of choice and embrace a wider notion 
of “marriage equality” by offering the option of polygamous marriage?    
 
                                                          
63 R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development [2018] 
UKSC 32; [2018] 3 W.L.R. 415.  
64  [2018] UKSC 32, at [62].  
65 Scottish Government, The future of civil partnership in Scotland (Scottish Government, Edinburgh, 
2018). 
66 Frances Gibb, “I will: May promises civil partnerships for all”, The Times, 3 October 2018. 
67 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 s.5(4)(b) and Civil Partnership Act 2004 s.86(1)(d).   
68 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 s.24(A1) and Civil Partnership Act 2004 s.100. 
69 Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972 s.2, providing that a Scottish court is “not 
… precluded” from granting a decree of divorce, nullity, separation or “any other decree involving a 
determination as to the validity of a marriage” and related ancillary orders in respect of a polygamous 
marriage.   
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The form of polygamy found in Scotland is confined to polygyny (a man having multiple 
wives) and polyandry (a woman having multiple husbands) appears to be unknown. 
That, in itself, offends against our benchmark of equality and it is the gendered nature of 
polygamy around the world that has led to its condemnation by a host of United Nations 
organisations.70 Similarly, the Supreme Court of British Columbia was addressing 
polygyny when it upheld the criminalisation of polygamy in Canada on the basis that it 
sought “to address the harms viewed as arising from polygamy; harms to women, to 
children, to society and, importantly, to the institution of monogamous marriage.”71  
  
That final point, that embracing a more inclusive definition of marriage would threaten 
the whole institution, thereby harming others, is thoroughly familiar from the debate over 
same sex marriage. It is as fallacious to suggest that permitting polygamy limits the 
freedom to marry of monogamists as it was to argue that allowing same sex marriage 
compromised the matrimonial liberty of heterosexuals.  
 
Another old chestnut, employed by the opponents of both same sex marriage and 
polygamy, is to take a particular facet of marriage, as it is defined at a given time – like 
the sex or number of parties – and treat it as an essential and immutable requirement. If 
a relationship does not satisfy the requirement, so the argument goes, then it is not a 
marriage and respect for equality does not require it to be treated as if it were.  
 
                                                          
70 Human Rights Committee, Equality of rights between men and women: General Comments adopted by 
the Human Rights Committee under article 40, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add 10 (2000), para.24 (polygamy “should be definitely abolished 
wherever it continues to exist”). Referring to polygamy, as well as early, forced and temporary marriage, 
the Human Rights Council concluded that, “not all forms of marriage deserve recognition”: Report of the 
Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and practice, A/HCR/29/40 (2015), 
para.26. 
71 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada 2011 BCSC 1588, [181]. That case arose 
from the practices of the breakaway Fundamental Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints whose 
members sought to avoid criminal penalties by refraining from any state involvement in their plural 
marriages. Rather than apply for multiple marriage licences, they confined unions after the first to 
“celestial” (religious) marriages. That strategy was unsuccessful in Canada, but worked in Utah: Brown v 
Buhman 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah, 2013), vacated Brown v Buhman 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir 2016) 
(moot in the light of the Attorney General’s undertaking not to prosecute).  
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It is also worth bearing in mind that the some of the evils laid at the door of polygamy – 
the exploitation of women and girls and domestic abuse – are sometimes present in 
monogamous marriage. It is quite possible to imagine a version of polygamy, open to 
men and women equally and in whatever gender combination the parties choose, that is 
no more or less oppressive than any other kind of marriage. Whether there is any 
appetite in Scotland for amending the law to provide for polygamy is open to question – 
and the Scottish Government has made clear its opposition to such a course72 – but, 
then, at one time, there was only limited support for same sex marriage.  
 
It is striking that the Canadian court that was so critical of polygamy was at pains to 
make clear that it was not criminalising polyamory.73 Unlike polygamy, which is usually 
formalised,74 polyamory is typically an informal arrangement, bearing a closer 
resemblance to non-marital cohabitation than to marriage. It has been characterised as 
a “post-modern form of multi-partner relationships unburdened by patriarchal gender 
roles, heterosexual constraints, or monogamous exclusivity.”75 In this, another crucial 
distinction between polygamy, as currently practiced, and polyamory is that the latter is 
open to all. With a little imagination, it would be possible to amend the legislation on 
cohabitation so that it embraces polyamory. Of course, for some polyamorists, one 
attraction of the arrangement is the lack of legal regulation. Whether respecting their 
liberty trumps another of our values, the protection of those in (or leaving) a 
polyamorous relationship, is a challenge that is also found in the context of two-party 
cohabitation.   
 
  
                                                          
72 The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill: A Consultation (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 
2012), para. 3.37 (“The Scottish Government has no intention of allowing polygamous marriages to take 
place in Scotland.”). 
73 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, paras. 1148 and 1266. 
74 There is usually a religious ceremony which the parties view as creating a valid marriage. 
75 Maura Strassberg, “The Crime of Polygamy” 12 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 353 (2003), 355.  
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CHILD LAW 
 
There is no single, dominant development – no equivalent to same sex marriage 
– that stands out in Scottish child law over the last thirty years. On the 
international stage, that honour goes to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC),76 adopted by General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1989; ratified by 
the United Kingdom, in 1991; and given the following ringing endorsement by the 
European Court of Human Rights:  
“The human rights of children and the standards to which all governments 
must aspire in realising these rights for all children are set out in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.”77  
 
Unlike the ECHR, the CRC has not been incorporated into domestic law, but it is 
cited routinely in courts across the UK, bringing benefits to children and, 
incidentally, to adults.78 In addition, incremental implementation of many of its 
key provisions has long been underway in Scotland, a process that was 
strengthened when the Scottish Ministers were placed under a statutory 
obligation to give active consideration to giving effect to the CRC requirements 
and to report, triennially, on their progress and plans for the next three years.79 
The Scottish Government has now committed to incorporating “the principles” of 
the CRC into domestic law80 and, since many of these principles have already 
been incorporated, further and more specific information about its plans is 
eagerly awaited.  
 
                                                          
76 1577 UNTS 3; (1989) 28 I.L.M. 1448.   
77 Sommerfeld v Germany (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 35, para. 37.   
78  ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4; [2011] 2 A.C. 166; Re 
McLaughlin [2018] UKSC 48; [2018] 1 W.L.R. 4250. 
79 Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 s.1. See, Progressing Children’s Rights in Scotland: 
An Action Plan 2018-21: Consultation (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2018) and Scottish Government, 
Delivering for Today, Investing for Tomorrow, op. cit., 83. 
80 Scottish Government, Delivering for Today, Investing for Tomorrow: The Government Programme for 
Scotland 2018-19 (2018), 12. 
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The absence of that lone, historic, domestic development does not mean, however, that 
child law has stagnated – far from it. There have been significant developments: in 
establishing clear, fundamental principles; in efforts to render the law more systematic; 
and in addressing specific, important issues. 
  
Three principles, first articulated coherently in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, now 
permeate Scots child law. The first requires courts, children’s hearings and other 
agencies of the state to accord paramountcy to the child’s welfare, save in very limited 
circumstances.81 Bearing in mind that adults determine what will serve a child’s welfare, 
it is clear that this principle is concerned more with protecting children than with their 
liberty, highlighting a constant challenge faced by legal systems in reconciling the two 
values when children are involved: what is known as the “rights v welfare” debate. 
  
A degree of respect for the child’s liberty, in the sense of empowerment, is found in the 
second principle, requiring decision-makers to give children the opportunity to express 
their views and to take account of these views in the light of the child’s age and 
maturity.82 That right to participate in decision-making is not equivalent to the autonomy 
accorded to adults, of course, with children’s liberty again being restricted by the need 
to protect them. The third principle also reflects respect for liberty, this time in the sense 
of freedom from undue intrusion, by mandating that no court order should be made 
unless making the order would be better for the child than not doing so.83   
 
Alongside these general principles, there are specific examples of significant, albeit not 
unqualified, progress in respecting all three of our benchmark values.  
 
                                                          
81 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 ss.11(7)(a) and 16(1) and the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 
s.25. The child’s welfare can be downgraded to “a primary consideration”, in the “public”, but not “private”, 
law context, in order to protect the public from serious harm: 2011 Act s.26.   
82 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 ss.6, 11(7)(b) and 16(2) and the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 
s.27. 
83 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s.11(7)(a) and 16(3) and the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 
ss.28(2) and 29(2). 
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From a young person’s perspective, nothing impacts (a lack of) respect for their liberty 
and equality more than minimum age limits. Yet respecting equality simply requires that 
those who are similarly situated should be treated in the same way. If it is accepted that 
children differ from adults in crucial respects – physically, developmentally, 
experientially and so forth – then it is easier to justify disempowering them for the time 
being, particularly if the goal is protective. That is consistent with the view of the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, that,  
“not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria 
for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a 
purpose that is legitimate under the Convention.”84  
The message, then, is clear. While being young is not, in itself, a justification for 
discrimination, different treatment on the basis of age may be permissible if it can be 
defended on other, objective grounds.85 Whether all of the current Scottish age limits 
pass that test is open to question.  
 
The Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 sought to rationalise aspects of age-
related rules when it replaced the sexist, common law concepts of pupillarity and 
minority86 with a system more focussed on graduated empowerment87 and 
individualised assessment,88 reflecting the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
concept of the child’s evolving capacity.89 The reform was not comprehensive, quite 
deliberately omitting both delictual liability and criminal responsibility,90 and bright line 
rules were retained for some purposes.91   
                                                          
84 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 20 on the implementation 
of the rights of the child during adolescence (2016), CRC/C/GC/20, para. 21. 
85 See further, Elaine E Sutherland, “Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Non-Discrimination and Children’s Rights” in Marit Skivenes and Karl Harald Søvig (eds), Child Rights 
and International Discrimination Law: Implementing Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (Oxford: Routledge, forthcoming 2019). 
86 Under the common law, children were divided into pupils and minors, with the latter, more empowered, 
status being attained by young women on reaching 12 years old, but not by young men until they reached 
14.   
87 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 ss.1, 2(1), 3 and 4 (transactions).   
88 1991 Act ss.2(4) and 2(4A) (consenting to medical treatment or instructing a solicitor in a civil matter).   
89 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 5.   
90 1991 Act s.1(3)(c). On delictual liability, see, Lesley-Anne Barnes Macfarlane, “Rethinking Childhood 
Contributory Negligence: ‘Blame’, ‘Fault’ – But What About Children’s Rights?” (2018) J.R. 75. 
91 1991 Act ss.2(2) and 2(3) (testamentary capacity and consent to own adoption).   
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The 1991 Act also left untouched a host of, sometimes inconsistent, subject-specific 
statutory provisions that restrict children’s access to particular commodities and 
activities in the name of protecting them92 and other members of the community.93 More 
recent legislation has done nothing to render age limits any more rational. On the one 
hand, the tendency has been to restrict94 and protect95 young people more and for 
longer.96 On the other hand, children are still held criminally responsible from the age of 
eight (soon to be raised to 12),97  while young people are enfranchised, in Scotland, 
from 16 years old.98  
 
The promotion of equality underscored the 2006 amendment to the Law Reform (Parent 
and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, designed to effect the “abolition of [the] status of 
illegitimacy”.99  Granted, the gain was somewhat symbolic since, even in 1992, when 
                                                          
92 Access to alcohol is an obvious example, with a general age limit of 18 being imposed: Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 1976 s.68. 
93 See, for example, the restrictions on driving a motor vehicle, with the ages being 16, 17 or 18, 
depending on the type of vehicle: Road Traffic Act 1988 s.101. 
94 See, for example, the restriction on using tanning salons introduced by the Public Health, etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2008 ss.95-96.   
95 See, for example, the extension of state responsibility to young people it has looked after from 21 to 25: 
Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.29(2), as amended by the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 
2014.  
96 The age for accessing tobacco products was raised from 16 to 18: Children and Young Persons 
(Scotland) Act 1937 s.18, as amended by the Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005 
(Variation of age limit for the sale of tobacco purchase and consequential modifications) Order 2007, SSI 
2007/437. 
97 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.41. A child below the age of 12 may not be prosecuted, nor 
may a person be prosecuted in respect of anything done before reaching that age: 1995 Act s.41A, added 
by the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 s.52(2). The Age of Criminal Responsibility 
(Scotland) Bill, SP Bill 29, 2018, which, at the time of writing, has completed Stage 1 of the legislative 
process, will raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility will to 12. For a discussion of the evolution 
of thinking on this issue in Scotland, see, Elaine E. Sutherland, “Raising the Minimum Age of Criminal 
Responsibility in Scotland:  Law Reform at Last?” (2016) 67 N.I.L.Q. 387. 
98 The right to vote, was extended to those aged 16 and over, first, for the Scottish independence 
referendum (Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 s.2) then for Scottish Parliament 
and local authority elections (Scotland Act 1998 s.11 and the Scottish Local Government Elections Order 
2011, SSI 2011/399, as amended most recently by the Scottish Local Government Elections Order 2016, 
SSI 2016/7). The age for voting for Westminster elections remains 18 years old (Representation of the 
People Act 1983 s.1) and two Private Member’s Bills, designed to reduce the age to 16, were introduced 
at Westminster in 2017.   
99 Law Reform (Parent and Child (Scotland) Act 1986 s.1, as amended by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
2006. 
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the Scottish Law Commission recommended the reform,100 the legal effects of birth 
status had already been diminished greatly. Since it remains relevant in the aristocratic 
context, where gender discrimination also reigns, the status has not truly been 
abolished.101   
 
When the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 created a comprehensive framework of parental 
responsibilities and parental rights and a regime governing their acquisition, operation 
and regulation and the resolution of disputes, the goal was undoubtedly to bring greater 
clarity and coherence to the law.102 That, in turn, furthered the protection of children by 
articulating the nature of duties owed to them and by whom. In the original version of 
the Act – and contrary to the recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission – the 
marital status of a child’s parents remained a significant legal marker.103 It was not until 
the Act was amended, in 2006, that non-marital fathers who register their paternity were 
able to acquire responsibilities and rights automatically, something that had been the 
case for mothers and fathers married from the outset.104 As a result, many more of their 
children now have two legal guardians, just like the children of married parents. The 
operation of that provision is not problem-free and we shall return to it presently. 
 
For some donor children, equality, in the sense of having two legal guardians, took 
longer to secure. While it was ground-breaking in many respects, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was unequivocally heteronormative in character 
when it determined who would be treated as the parents of donor children of different 
sex couples.105 It was not until 2008 that statute accommodated the children of same 
                                                          
100 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Family Law (Scot Law Com No 135, 1992), para 17.4. 
101 Law Reform (Parent and Child (Scotland) Act 1986 s 9(1)(c) and (ca)); Re Baronetcy of Pringle of 
Stichill [2016] UKPC 16; 2016 S.C. (P.C.) 1. See further, Sir Crispin Agnew and Gillian Black, “The 
significance of status and genetics in succession to titles, honours, dignities and coats of arms: Making 
the case for reform” (2018) 77 Camb. L.J. 321. 
102 That is all the more apparent in the original version since the statute also addressed child protection. 
103 Non-marital father did not acquire parental responsibilities and parental rights automatically, with 
unmarried parents being given the option of concluding an agreement to share responsibilities and rights: 
1995 Act s.4.   
104 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 amending the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s.3. Fathers who 
registered before the 2006 amendment came into effect, on 4 April 2006, must re-register to benefit from 
it. 
105 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 ss.27-28. 
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sex couples by providing for the birth mother’s partner being treated as the child’s 
second parent.106 
 
For other donor children, whether they know that they are a product of donated gametes 
is often wholly at the discretion of the adults who raise them, since there is no system in 
place to ensure that they are informed. Assuming the child does know, the further 
information available will depend on when the donation was made, with some children 
gaining access to non-identifying information only while, in the future, others will be 
furnished with details of the donor’s identity.107 In all of this, it seems clear that the 
privacy of donors, some of whom were promised anonymity, and the recipients who 
choose to conceal the truth from the children, is being prioritised over the liberty interest 
of children.    
 
Enormous efforts have been directed at improving child protection in Scotland over the 
last thirty years,108 with wide-ranging legislation that seeks to prevent unsuitable people 
from working with children109 and court orders designed to keep sexual predators away 
from them.110 In addition to the general protection offered by the criminal law, there has 
been reform of the law on sexual offences that can be committed only against 
children111 and efforts have been made to keep pace with developments by creating 
new offences designed to combat dangers posed by the Internet.112   
 
The challenge for child protection, in the family setting, lies in creating an effective 
system of prevention and, where necessary, intervention, at the same time as 
                                                          
106 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 Act ss.35-47. An expedited adoption procedure is 
available to accommodate surrogacy: 2008 Act ss.54-55.   
107 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 ss.31 and 31ZA-31ZB and Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2004, S.I. 2004/1511. 
108 For a discussion of developments, see, Elaine E. Sutherland, “Scotland: Proactive Child Protection: A 
Step Too Far?” in Margaret F Brinig and Fareda Banda (eds), International Survey of Family Law: 2017 
Edition (Bristol: Jordans, 2017). 
109 Protection of Vulnerable Groups (Scotland) Act 2007. 
110 See, for example, the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 ss.10-25 (sexual harm 
prevention orders) and ss.26-36 (sexual risk orders). 
111 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 ss.18-45. 
112 Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005, s 1.   
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respecting the liberty and privacy of children and their parents. Getting the balance 
wrong can result, either in over-zealous intervention that causes distress and harm to 
families, or in a failure to respond timeously and adequately, sometimes with fatal 
consequences.113   
 
Passed in the wake of the infamous Orkney case,114  the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 
revised the various court orders designed to enable the local authority to protect 
children, through mandatory intervention, if necessary, and the operation of the 
children’s hearings system. However, the turning point came with devolution and the 
adoption of Getting It Right For Every Child (“GIRFEC” to the cognoscenti),115 an 
approach to child protection premised on early intervention, integration of services and 
the sharing of information between agencies.  
 
Legislation followed, spreading the protective measures across a number of statutes116 
and sometimes translating aspects of social work practice into law. The concept of child 
“wellbeing”, assessed on the basis of the, woefully vague, SHANARRI indicators,117 was 
added to the Scottish legal lexicon.118 Policy and practice have been reviewed and 
considerable resources have been devoted to new initiatives. Hitherto, intervention in 
the lives of families had been premised, either on voluntary participation, with the state 
providing assistance and services,119 or on the local authority securing a court order 
                                                          
113 Sharon Vincent and Alison Petch, Audit and Analysis of Significant Case Reviews (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Government, 2012) and Learning From Significant Case Reviews in Scotland: A retrospective review of 
relevant reports completed in the period between 1 April 2012 and 31 March 2015 (Dundee: Care 
Inspectorate, 2016).  
114 Sloan v B 1991 S.L.T. 530. There, 9 children from 4 different families were removed from their homes 
amid allegations of sexual abuse, only to be returned 5 weeks later without the allegations being tested in 
court. 
115 For Scotland’s Children (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2001) and Report of the Child Protection Audit 
and Review: It’s everyone’s job to make sure I’m alright (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2001). 
116 Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 s.84 (permanence orders) and Children’s Hearings 
(Scotland) Act 2011 (child assessment orders and child protection orders). Exclusion orders remained in 
the 1995 Act. 
117 SHANARRI is an acronym, reflecting assessment of wellbeing by reference to the extent to which the 
child is or would be “Safe, Healthy, Achieving, Nurtured, Active, Respected, Responsible, and Included”: 
Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 s.96(2). 
118 Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 s.96. See further, Emma Coles, Helen Cheyne, Jean 
Rankin and Brigid Daniels, “Getting It Right for Every Child: A National Policy Framework to Promote 
Children’s Well-being in Scotland, United Kingdom” (2016) 94(2) Millbank Q.334. 
119 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 Part II. 
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sanctioning mandatory intervention. Such an order will only be granted where the local 
authority has satisfied a threshold test by demonstrating the likelihood of “significant 
harm” to the child or the like, save in an emergency.120  Similarly, statutory criteria must 
be met before a child can be referred to a children’s hearing.121 
  
The latest innovation in child protection, the named person service, represents a radical 
departure from that model and takes early intervention to a new level.122 Under the 
original plan, (almost) every child in Scotland would be allocated a “named person” 
automatically without the need to justify the appointment by satisfying any threshold 
test. The named person would give advice, information and support to the child, young 
person and the parents; would help them to access services; and would have the power 
and the obligation to communicate concerns about the child to other agencies. For 
some parents and organisations, that level of state supervision of parenting was a step 
too far and they challenged the scheme, with the case eventually reaching the Supreme 
Court.123 
 
It is familiar territory that the overall scheme survived human rights scrutiny, since it is 
rationally connected to the pursuit of a legitimate aim: child protection.124 Criticism was 
reserved for the complex provisions on the sharing of information between agencies 
that were not sufficiently accessible, making it difficult to gauge whether they were being 
applied arbitrarily. This rendered these provisions “incompatible with the rights of 
children, young persons and parents under article 8 of the ECHR”125 and they fell.126 
The Scottish Government was given the opportunity to correct the defects127 and, at the 
time of writing, is still attempting to do so.128 Whether it will succeed in striking the 
requisite balance remains to be seen, but it has been given an object lesson: that is, 
                                                          
120 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s.76 (exclusion orders) and Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 
ss.35-39 (child assessment orders and child protection orders).  
121 2011 Act s.66(2). 
122 Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 Part 4. 
123 Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2016] UKSC 51; 2017 S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 29. 
124 2017 S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 29, [93]. 
125 2016 S.L.T. 805, [106].  
126 Scotland Act 1998 s.29(2)(d). 
127 Ibid s.102(2)(b). 
128 Children and Young People (Information Sharing) (Scotland) Bill, SP Bill 17, 2017. 
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there are limits on the extent to which it will be permitted to compromise privacy in the 
name of protection. 
 
Having had its fingers burned so recently, there was concern that the Scottish 
Government might be reluctant to risk offending some parents’ rights groups again by 
supporting a Members Bill that would remove the defence of “justifiable assault” from 
parents who hit their children.129 The issue of physical punishment of children has long 
been a blot on the Scottish legal landscape and one that, despite legislative efforts to 
limit parental latitude,130 has continued to attract wholly-justified condemnation from 
international human rights organisations.131 In the event, the Government expressed 
support for the Bill132 and, if it passes, may find itself facing further litigation. While 
making predictions is an inherently risky business, it is likely that the proposed reform 
would survive a human rights challenge.133       
   
Scope for reform 
 
Just as no single reform dominates developments in child law over the last thirty years, 
no major issues of principle remain to be resolved. Balancing liberty and protection will 
continue to be testing, but that tension is often more manifest when children, young 
people and their families are involved. The fundamental principles underpinning Scots 
child law are, it is submitted, sound. The challenge for the legal system lies in ensuring 
that they work better – or work at all – across the board, something appreciated by the 
Scottish Government in its recent consultation on the 1995 Act, Part 1.134 
                                                          
129 Children (Equal Protection from Assault) (Scotland) Bill, SP Bill 38, 2018, proposed by John Finnie, 
MSP.   
130 The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 s.51, replaced the common law concept of “reasonable 
chastisement” with the defence of “justifiable assault” and further provided that an assault will never be 
considered “justifiable” if it involved a blow to the head, shaking the child or the use of an implement. 
131 See, most recently, Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic 
report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7, 17 August 2015, 
para. 20 and UNCRC, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/CO/5, 3 June 2016, para. 41. 
132 Scottish Government, Delivering for Today, Investing in Tomorrow, op. cit., 82. 
133 Williamson v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15; [2005] 2 A.C. 246. 
134 Review of Part 1 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and creation of a Family Justice Modernisation 
Strategy: A Consultation (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2018). 
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Making the fundamental principles work better 
 
For the legal system to accord paramountcy to the child’s welfare is wholly defensible, 
particularly when it is remembered that children are often least able to advocate for, and 
protect, their own interests. Treating the child’s welfare as paramount offsets the 
danger, either of adopting the, often unspoken, assumption that the interests of children 
and their parents are necessarily the same, with the result that they are conflated, or of 
adult rights simply being prioritised over those of children.  
 
For children and young people, the liberty-limiting effect of prioritising welfare is 
mitigated somewhat by the second of the fundamental principles, requiring decision-
makers to respect their participation rights. Here, the challenge to the legal system is 
one of practice rather than law, and lies in addressing the very real concerns over the 
extent to which children are, in fact, listened to in the family setting135 and whether the 
mechanisms for hearing their voices in court proceedings,136 in the child protection 
context137 and in children’s hearings are as effective as they might be.138  The third of 
the fundamental principles, requiring the court to refrain from making any non-beneficial 
order, again, serves to bolster liberty, this time, for both children and their parents.139 
 
It is clear, then, that the welfare of the child, while not the only card, is something of a 
trump card. Yet Scots law does not define welfare and there is no statutory “welfare 
checklist” of the kind found in many other jurisdictions.140 It is again familiar territory 
                                                          
135 Elaine E. Sutherland, “Listening to the Child’s Voice in the Family Setting: From Aspiration to Reality” 
(2014) 26 C.F.L.Q. 152. 
136 For a discussion of the methods by which a child’s views may be ascertained, see, Shields v 
Shields 2002 S.C. 246 at [11]. At the time of writing, the Family Law Committee of the Scottish Civil 
Justice Council and the Scottish Government are examining this issue.   
137 Susan Elsley, E Kay M Tisdall and Emma Davidson, Children and young people’s views on child 
protection systems in Scotland (Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2013), at [5.6]-[5.8], 
[5.16] and [5.45].  
138 The Education and Skills Committee of the Scottish Parliament recommended steps that could be 
taken to improve children’s participation in children’s hearings: The Children’s Hearings System – Taking 
Stock of Recent Reforms (Scottish Parliament Education and Skills Committee, 2017), at [140]-[150].   
139 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s.11(7)(a) and the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 ss.28 and 29.   
140 See, Elaine E. Sutherland, “The Welfare Test: Determining the Indeterminate” 2018 Edin. L.R. 94.  
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that, back in the mists of 1992, the Scottish Law Commission rejected the idea of a 
checklist on the basis that it would be necessarily incomplete, might divert attention 
from other factors which ought to be considered and risked judges taking a mechanical 
approach to decision-making in order to minimise the prospect of a successful 
appeal.141 Following what became a very gendered debate, the 1995 Act was amended, 
in 2006, with courts being directed to pay special attention to the need to protect the 
child from abuse, when assessing welfare, and to the likelihood of parental cooperation 
where that would be required by any order it was contemplating.142 
 
As a result, there is now a partial, statutory checklist that emphasises some important 
factors that are relevant in assessing welfare, but makes no mention of others. A better 
solution would be to provide the kind of “non-exhaustive and non-hierarchical” statutory 
welfare checklist recommended, and explained in some detail, by the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child.143  Drafting such a checklist would be 
challenging, of course, and it can be anticipated that adult interest groups would lobby 
hard for presumptions of various hues based on claims about what is good for children. 
That makes it crucial that such claims are not simply taken at face value and that 
research findings and expert evidence produced in support them are subjected to 
rigorous, critical analysis. As long as children’s rights and interests remain to the fore, 
the courts and other decision-makers would be provided with more useful and concrete 
guidance in discharging their task. It may be that this new, improved welfare test would 
prove so helpful that chid “wellbeing” and the SHANARRI indicators could be returned 
to the realms of social work practice, where they rightly belong, avoiding the confusion 
that their continued use in statute is otherwise sure to bring. 
 
Applying the principles 
 
                                                          
141 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Family Law, op. cit., paras 5.20-5.23 
142 1995 Act s.11(7A)-(7E). 
143 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 14 on the right of the child 
to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1) (2013), 
CRC/GC/2013/14, para. 50. 
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As we have seen, the Family Law (Scotland) Act, 2006 sought to remove the concept of 
illegitimacy from Scots law. To this end, it amended the 1995 Act so that non-marital 
fathers who registered their paternity acquire responsibilities and rights automatically, 
just like mothers and married fathers.144 Yet parental marital status remains a significant 
legal marker where the child’s mother seeks to exclude the non-marital father from the 
child’s life. First, she can refuse to permit him to register his paternity, putting him to the 
trouble and expense of seeking a declarator of parentage.145 She can then impede his 
progress further by withholding her consent to DNA testing of the child, denying him 
access to crucial evidence. The court has no power to order testing in the face of 
maternal opposition146 and, while it may draw an adverse inference from her refusal147 
and courts have done so on occasion,148 such an outcome is far from guaranteed.149  
 
There are no doubt mothers who have good, child-centred reasons for seeking to keep 
their child’s father out of the picture, but there are others whose motives are less noble. 
The appropriate role, if any, of the father – or, indeed, any other person – in a child’s life 
is a matter to be determined by applying the fundamental principles of child law and it 
does not serve the child’s interests for the legal system to permit the child’s mother to 
delay or prevent the case getting to that stage. 
  
It might be argued that equality would be served by allowing all non-marital fathers to 
register their paternity without maternal consent, just like married fathers.150 That 
exemplifies the danger of conflating adult interests with those of children since such a 
course would fall foul of another of our benchmarks – protection – by exposing the child 
(and the mother) to a man registering paternity when he was mistaken or mischievous 
                                                          
144 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 amending the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s.3.   
145 Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, s.7. 
146 1986 Act, s.6. 
147 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990 s.70. 
148 S v S 2014 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 165. 
149 Smith v Greenhill 1994 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 22. 
150 Another option that would ensure equality would be to require maternal consent for a married father to 
register, but that would be likely to meet with public opposition and might be open to challenge under 
Article 8 of the ECHR. 
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or malicious. A less radical option for reform would be to permit the court to authorise 
DNA testing in the face of maternal opposition.151   
  
Children, in Scotland, experience a variety of family types, with the majority sharing a 
home with one or both of their parents, while some live with a parent and step-parent, 
sometimes in blended families, or with other relatives.152 The 1995 Act acknowledges 
the role of people other than the child’s parents, first, by permitting anyone who has 
care or control of a child to “do what is necessary in the circumstances to safeguard the 
child’s health, development and welfare”.153 Having parental responsibilities and 
parental rights is the real ticket to engage in parenting of a child and the second way the 
1995 Act recognises non-parents is by permitting anyone with an interest to apply to the 
court for an order relating to these responsibilities and rights.154 Step-parents and 
grandparents have taken advantage of this provision, but each group has long 
campaigned for greater legal recognition.155  
 
Step-parents have lobbied for law reform that would enable them to acquire parental 
responsibilities and parental rights by agreement with the child’s parent.156 
Grandparents have called for an automatic right to contact with a grandchild, sometimes 
finessing their claim by petitioning for the creation of a right, vested in the child, to 
contact with a grandparent.157 Each group argues that what it seeks would serve the 
                                                          
151 Elaine E. Sutherland, “It is a wise father …’, J.L.S.S. online, 16 June 2014: 
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/59-6/1014070.aspx [Accessed 30 November 2018].   
152 The 2011 Census recorded 614,000 families with dependent children living in Scotland, 54% being 
married couple families, 15% being cohabiting couple families and 31% being lone parent families. Step-
families made up 8% of married couple families and 29% of cohabiting couple families. See, “Census 
2011: Release 3E” (Edinburgh: National Records of Scotland, 2014): 
https://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/news/2014/census-release-3e [Accessed 30 November 2018]. For this 
purpose, “dependent children” are children under 16 or between 16 and 18 and in full-time education. 
153 1995 Act s.5. 
154 1995 Act s.11(3)(a). 
155 Each campaigned in the lead-up to the 2006 Act: Parents and Children: A White Paper on Scottish 
Family Law (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2000), paras. 2.25-2.45 and proposal 2 (step-parents) and 
para. 2.44 (grandparents).  
156 Such agreements between parents and step-parents are available in England and Wales; Adoption 
and Children Act 2002 s.112.   
157 See, the Public Petitions lodge by, or on behalf of, Grandparents Apart on 8 March 2000 and 30 April 
2007: Petition PE124 and Petition PE1051. Following the rejection of grandparents’ claims during the 
passage of the 2006 Act, the Scottish Executive produced the Charter for Grandchildren (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive, 2006).  
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child’s welfare but, in each case, the goal is to bypass the court where the decision 
would be reached by applying the fundamental principles. Neither step-parents nor 
grandparents are homogenous groups. Their relationships with the individual children 
concerned will vary, one family from another. In short, there is no escaping the 
conflation of adult interests with those of children inherent in these calls for law reform 
and the attendant risk of children being commodified in the process.   
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In his 1989 article, Professor Clive acknowledged the danger inherent in making 
predictions before forecasting that “a period of relative stability lies ahead in family 
law.”158 Very sensibly, he did not indicate how long the period would last. Thirty years is 
a long time in the law and, as we have seen, much has happened in child and family 
law. Ironically, as the lead Commissioner on family law projects at the Scottish Law 
Commission from 1981-2000, Professor Clive was the architect of quite a number of 
these reforms. How, then, have our benchmarks of liberty, equality and protection fared 
during this time?  
 
There has been progress in respect of all three. The liberty of same sex couples was 
undoubtedly served when civil partnership, then marriage, became available to them, 
bringing the protection offered by these formal relationships. Respect for equality lies at 
the heart of these reforms and it was inevitable, perhaps, that this would produce a 
heightened awareness of the unequal treatment of other intimate relationships. In the 
longer term, the result may be that a menu of relationships – cohabitation, civil 
partnership, monogamous and polygamous marriage and polyamory – being offered to 
all of sufficient age and capacity.  
 
That, in turn, presents something of a challenge in terms of our benchmarks. If the goal 
is to enhance liberty by giving individuals choice, then meaningful choice requires the 
relationships to differ in significant respects (beyond the obvious of the number of 
                                                          
158 Ibid, 145. 
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parties). The law can draw distinctions between various kinds of relationship most 
effectively by attaching different legal consequences to them. That will result in the legal 
system offering less protection to parties in one kind of relationship than to those in 
another. Yet experience teaches us that individuals often do a poor job of protecting 
their interests when matters of the heart are at stake, regardless of how the law 
classifies their relationship.  
 
The liberty of children and young people has been advanced through greater 
recognition of them as rights-holders, something that was in its infancy in 1989. Children 
are now treated more equally, one with another, by the legal system. Often, they are not 
treated like adults, but they are not adults and a more protective approach may be 
warranted in respect of them, provided always that a sound justification is provided for 
the different treatment. The fundamental principles of child law, now clearly articulated 
in statute, accord paramountcy to the welfare of the child and seek to temper the limit 
that imposes on their liberty through the obligations to listen to their views and desist 
from making non-beneficial orders. While reconciling liberty and protection will always 
be a challenge, the real scope for reform lies in refining the fundamental principles and 
applying them rigorously. 
 
Ensuring that liberty, equality and protection are reflected in the lived experience of all 
members of Scottish society requires a great deal more than sound laws and it is not 
the purpose of this article to offer a blueprint of the socio-economic reforms that would 
be required to achieve that end. Suffice to say that getting the substantive law right is an 
essential part of the process. 
 
It is encouraging, then, that child and family law is currently attracting unprecedented 
attention from government and civil society. At the time of writing, the Scottish 
Government, the Scottish Civil Justice Council and the Scottish Law Commission all 
have family law projects underway. Inquiries have been established to examine specific 
issues and individual Members of the Scottish Parliament are taking the opportunity to 
initiate legislation. A wide range of non-governmental organisations and individuals are 
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active in lobbying for law reform. This abundance of interest will undoubtedly produce, 
sometimes conflicting, recommendation for law reform. If we fail to get the substantive 
law right, it will not be for the want of trying.  
